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Text File | 1994-05-02 | 12KB | 223 lines

<text> <title> Russian Relations with Muslim Republics Eyed </title> <article> <hdr> Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 18, 1992 Russia: Russian Relations With Muslim Republics Eyed </hdr> <body> [Article by Professor Aleksey Vasilyev, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Africa Institute: "Russia and the Muslim World--Partners or Opponents?" Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 92 Morning Edition p 6] [Text] Russia's foreign policy is now being shaped under the influence of two opposing groupings which reflect in a conventional manner the internal polarization of Russian society. One grouping, which may conventionally be called the "Atlanticists," advocates the maximum, speediest rapprochement with the West and the establishment of relations as an ally with the United States. They now fear Iran as the focus of "Islamic fundamentalism." The other group, which reflects neo-Bolshevik trends, calls for the maximum distancing from the West and is even ready to return to the self-defeating confrontation with the West, which is destructive to Russia. At present it is in the minority, and only the very hypothetical success of a neo-Bolshevik coup can lend force to the voices of its supporters. There are, however, many dangers inherent in identifying the interests of Russia with those of the United States. One of these is the threat to Russia's positions in the Muslim world with regard to "nearby foreign parts"--the new independent states in the south of the former USSR. Previously the axis of confrontation on a global scale lay between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization, or between the West and the East, or between western civilization and its illegitimate child--communist pseudocivilization. A new axis of tension is now becoming apparent, namely North-South or, in other words, between the West and the Muslim world above all. Russia could also find itself drawn into this confrontation. Conflicts in Eurasia are inevitable. The Eurasian area, which used to be occupied by the Soviet Union and most of which is now occupied by Russia, has traditionally been a zone of cohabitation, interpenetration, and interaction between the Slav (above all, Russian) and Turkic ethnoses, between orthodox [Christians] and Muslims. Russia now has the longest--many thousands of kilometers!--borders of all European countries with the Muslim world. As in former times, this is a belt of joint habitation of two ethnicities. Conflicts between them, which are inevitable, ought to be translated into a nonviolent form and be resolved by all conceivable means in the interests of the two sides. If conflicts turn into bloody internecine strife, this will mean self-destruction both for Russia and for the Turkic Muslim peoples. It would be naive in the extreme to expect simply harmonious cohabitation, to expect a pleasant and easy movement toward new forms of cooperation. Both the self-identification of Turkic peoples and the legitimation of their former or new political elites can occur only on two bases--nationalism and Islam. Both of these will evidently take on a definite anti-Russian hue in a short space of time and will become a means of alienating the two ethnicities and of definite estrangement at state level. It is necessary to expect this process and to treat its manifestations without hysteria. It will be natural if the new states take three or four steps away from Russia. Iranian and Turkish Raison Compete with Central Asian Raisins Under these conditions two more powerful neighbors than the newly formed states--Turkey and Iran--are once again, as during many hundreds of years, joining in the struggle for influence. The reestablishment of long-forgotten ties--ethnic, cultural, religious--with their first and second cousins across the Soviet Union's former border is also a natural process. How far it will go is another matter. How strong the influence of these two countries over the southern republics will prove is another matter too. Whereas the linguistics and geographic proximity of Turkey and Azerbaijan ensures greater rapprochement, Central Asia is too remote from Turkey. Iran's geographic proximity can be complemented by influence over the Shiites of Azerbaijan and the limited number of Shiites of Central Asia, and Iran's influence can be underpinned by common ethnic and linguistic roots in Tajikistan. At present Ankara and Tehran are rivals in the matter of establishing diplomatic ties with the Transcaucasus and Central Asia and are courting the political leaders of the newly created states. Their rivalry has not impeded their joint actions--the admission of a number of Muslim states of the former USSR to the Economic Cooperation Organization, of which Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are members. It is possible to voice doubts about the actual economic efficacy of that political gesture. For many decades and, in some cases, hundreds of years, all the economic ties of the southern republics were oriented northward. It is simply impossible to change their direction by the wave of a magic wand. It will require efforts costing many billions [currency not specified] just to build roads to Turkey and Iran, and who will undertake to fund them? The export potentials of the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics and of Turkey and Iran are not complementary but in competition. Azerbaijani oil or Turkmen gas will hardly be bought by Iran, which is rich in hydrocarbons, and Turkey is at present beyond geographic reach. Moreover, Iranian and Turkish raisins compete with Central Asian raisins... Therefore forces of attraction with regard to Russia--of an economic nature, above all--will operate in theses states in addition to forces of repulsion. It is precisely economic necessity that will make Russia and the new Muslim states take two or three steps toward each other. It is not only the economy that will determine the future of our relations. Despite all the absurdity of the communist regime, efforts--very vigorous efforts, too--were made to raise the social and cultural level of the population in the former Soviet republics. Even now the level of education and literacy in these republics are higher than in Turkey and Iran. The local intelligentsia will retain its national pride and traditional ties with Russian centers of science and education after a period of national self-assertion. The inhabitants of particular republics who have ended up outside their own national states will play a special role in relations among the states of the former Soviet Union. This is one of the key problems, for approximately 65 million people now live outside the borders of their own national republics, more than 25 million Russians live outside Russia, mainly in Ukraine, but many millions also live in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus. Therefore any confrontation with Russia on the part of Kazakhstan, where Russians make up more than one-half the population, or Kyrgyzstan, where they make up almost one-third of the inhabitants, could lead to destructive civil wars. The leaders of these republics are endeavoring to avoid such a development of events. Obviously, the Russian-speaking population will try to push the new states toward cooperation with Russia. Although the possibility of a mass resettlement of Russians from some of them, following the example of the resettlement of the French from Algeria, should not be ruled out. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that the Russian-speaking population was never socially privileged in the areas where it lived in the republics, like the French or the British in their own colonial possessions. Therefore, local nationalism, even with an Islamic hue, can have a long-term anti-Russian thrust only if it is artificially fanned. It will not, however, be easy for the Russians, the inhabitants of the Muslim